ABSTRACT Two particularly important dichotomies for anyone studying modern social theory are Marx's distinction between use values and exchange values and Weber's distinction between substantive and formal rationality. Indeed, it might be argued that in these dichotomies lies a basis for understanding core elements of several of their most central arguments concerning capitalism as one of the three or four key institutions of/in modernity. In this article, I want not only to discuss the functions performed by these dichotomies in their respective theoretical structures, but also to indicate some later instances of parallel forms of thinking. My aim here is to address both the central role of dichotomies and dichotomization, and some important differences in the ways they are deployed in and/or function as theoretical strategies.
dichotomies constitutes a vehicle for bringing to disciplined consciousness attitudes and world views already held or generally accepted by the thinker or speaker. As such, they possess both the strengths and the weaknesses of all second-order constructs relative to the first-order constructs of everyday life, namely that they achieve greater conceptual precision, but at the cost of the complexity of empirical reality (Weber, 1949: 89-111; [1918 : 8-11). For this reason it makes sense to treat them as approaches to reality rather than solely, or even mainly, as ways of describing it (Weber, 1949: 106-7; Wilson, 1984: 8-11; 1999b) .
Having said this, a number of issues present themselves to anyone anxious to penetrate the deep reality of dichotomization as a culturally available and socially and intellectually necessary practice for members. A most important consideration is the relation that obtains, or is supposed to obtain, between each 'side' of the dichotomy. Does one side environ the other, or do they carve up reality such that there is a fairly even division? Is one side the ideal that its other fails to measure up to? Or is it an originary and/or future telos or end point? If the latter, then is there alleged to be a discernible process whereby one achieves or again achieves this origin/goal? How much of its attainment is inevitable and how much determined and/or a function of human agency? From the questions I have asked, it must be clear that I am addressing the kinds of dichotomies formulated in moral philosophy, in social and political thought and, more recently, in the social sciences.
These questions raise important issues about conceptual and theoretical strategies, as well as constituting key features of a thinker's work. They also provide us with important ways of understanding this work, including not only what motivates it but also the intellectual and practical lineage of its central dichotomies. What 'family resemblances' or 'elective affinities' do these dichotomies bear to other concepts, as well as to those that are either contrary or opposite to them (Weber, 1946a (Weber, [1917 Wittgenstein, 1953: no. 67 )? In addition, all dichotomies of any gravity have a history, and some even have 'careers'. It is necessary to know what these are if we are adequately to place them in their milieu for a fuller understanding of and sensitivity to their meaning. Again, this may be a more relevant consideration for dichotomies and distinctions in moral philosophy, social and political thought, and the social sciences. This is principally because dichotomization would appear to be an even more central feature of the investigative method or procedure in these disciplines than is the case in the natural sciences (Greimas, 1968) .
The greatest thinkers in these fields regularly accompany their expository work with periodic indications that they are attempting to be methodologically and/or procedurally self-conscious while in the midst of carrying it out. One way of achieving this would be to 'stand back' from what they are doing from time to time in order to reflect on how and why they are doing it, both in a general sense and in their own specific way. How does their theoretical strategy make sense to them as a device for achieving a fuller understanding, and a more effective presentation, of the issues they are addressing? Another would see this standing back as a way of asserting or reasserting matters of principle that must not be allowed to slip into the background or be forgotten. In this latter case the link between the topical and the prescriptive function of dichotomies would be even closer to the surface than is the case with thinkers engaged in less transparent theoretical strategies.
These two forms of methodological or theoretical self-consciousness roughly correspond to those of Marx and Weber, respectively. In both cases it is striking how each acknowledges the role of his key 'significant others' relative to the dominance of the more immediately 'real', albeit incomplete or false, side of the dichotomy. In Marx, the relation of use value to exchange value involves the temporal precedence of use values, as well as a preference for these values as ones that will ultimately triumph over exchange values in and through a historical process of human unfolding. Thus exchange values take the form of a distortion, albeit a historically necessary distortion, which yet constitutes the driving force of this process, particularly as it reaches its apogee in a dominantly (if never fully) capitalist society (Marx, 1973 (Marx, [1857 : 100-3, 547, 881; 1976 [1846/72] : Ch. 1; Meikle, 1985; Wilson, 1991) .
For Weber, to a far greater extent than for Marx, the activity of dichotomization is conditioned by his conscious attempt to function as a methodologist in and for the emerging discipline of (German) sociology (Cahnman, 1964: 103-27) . While Weber formulates second-order constructs like Verstehen, he also seeks a greater transparency by raising to this same level the process itself in his discussion of 'ideal types' -Weber's formalization of what phenomenologists would later call 'second-order constructs' (Schütz, 1962 (Schütz, -4, 1967 . For Weber, the need to rely upon and utilize concepts with which he disagreed constituted nowhere near the problem that it did for Marx, doubtless because of his more central role and status in the dominant intellectual controversies of the day in Germany. In clear contrast is Marx, a refugee in one or another jurisdiction while he carried out his major writings, but one who hoped that his critique of political economy would become part of the discipline of economics long after it was clear that this would not be the case.
Social Science and Its Significant Others
My utilization of the term 'significant other' as a way of making reference to the residual yet (if anything) more important function of use values and substantive rationality relative to exchange values and formal rationality, respectively, requires some explanation. The 'significant other' is a core concept in sociology and the social sciences generally that addresses those persons, groups and institutions whose norms, values, principles and standards are or ought to be aspired to by members of their respective collectives. Significant others embody, or are intended to embody, the cultural -even trans-cultural -centrality and integrity of a given collective's core values. Not surprisingly, they are therefore key elements of what social scientists call the socialization experience, the process whereby norms, values, principles and standards are transmitted to ensuing generations and new arrivals (Brim and Wheeler, 1966) .
In calling use value and substantive rationality 'significant others' because of the way they function as key concepts in social research strategies, I am addressing a central institution of modern Western reason -disciplined observation between theoretical reflection and daily life practice. The form of life that this commitment to disciplined observation gives to modern Western civilization is reflected in its belief in autonomous 'facts of life', and in the central role of disciplined observation in the regularized and timely apprehension of these facts that this civilization requires (Wilson, 1977b (Wilson, , 1984 . At the same time, however, both use value and substantive rationality (as well as their respective other sides) and the significant other are concepts that are located in disciplinary and professional practices which have to be explained to most members. Both are thus second-order, intellectual constructs (like their respective dichotomies) rather than the first-order ones that characterize everyday life within given cultures, classes and groups (Schütz, 1962-4) .
For Marx and Weber both the process of conceptualization in general, and their own constructs in particular, were practices that they believed should be rendered as transparent as possible without compromising the scholarly task. This was to be accomplished either through an analytic standing back (for both thinkers) or a principled interlude (Weber) , either in the process of the exposition itself (both) or in special essays and treatises devoted more concertedly to the goal of methodological clarification (Weber) . Having said this, however, it is necessary to qualify the statement already made to the effect that use values and substantive rationality, as well as their respective dichotomies, are second-order constructs. This is because while use values and substantive rationality are second-order constructs, both on their own and as part of a dichotomy, they are also first-order constructs, or rather second-order constructs of first-order constructs (Voegelin, 1952: 29) .
While it is certainly the case that this claim also holds for their respective other sides -exchange value and formal rationality -it is to the difference between them rather than to the similarities on this score that we need to attend. In the event, use values and substantive rationality are not distinguished from exchange values and formal rationality simply because the former are idealized and prescriptive first-order constructs while the latter are real and descriptive. Even in the case of Weber, and certainly in that of Marx, this would be not only to simplify the matter but also to distort it fundamentally, by reconstructing the difference as one reducible to the distinction between values and facts. For in both instances the ground provided by an understanding of the priority of use values and substantive rationality, because of their superior access to the deeply real or true, motivates each thinker's theoretical strategy in his deployment of these central, even elemental, dichotomies.
There is a sense in the work of both that by 'deeply' real is meant not only, or even mainly, historical or final priority but also a kind of phenomenological priority, albeit one that is dynamic rather than reducible to the static distinction between base and superstructure. Thus each respectively regards use values and substantive rationality not only as grounding exchange values and formal rationality but also as continually generating them from human, or humanly produced, resources. These resources are at one and the same time continually present to human beings in the world while nonetheless being more 'essential' (Marx) or 'substantive' (Weber) than their respective other sides. Yet the central role of humanity over time and space in its own history-making on earth explains how it is that use values and perhaps even substantive rationality can, indeed must, generate forms different from, and even in conflict with, themselves (Wilson, 1999b) . The display of difference, conflict and especially contradiction is, after all, the very purpose of both dichotomies, rather than an unintended result of their utilization and deployment by Marx and Weber (Jameson, 1973; Wilson, 1984: 88-97) .
Thus each dichotomy consists of both a second-order construct and a second-order construct of two first-order constructs. The point, however, is that use value and substantive rationality produce the side that is deeper, and not just in an ideal or prescribed sense that can be reduced solely or mainly to the distinction between values and facts. The limitation inherent in employing concepts and dichotomies that seek through second-order constructs to depict first-order constructs that are either different, contrasting, opposed or contradictory to one another requires us to resist this tendency to reduce them. This is particularly important when the result is a dichotomy that is more unreflectively taken for granted because it is assumed to be more coterminous with a more directly apprehended reality. What is accomplished by such a reduction dissipates the tension inherent in the original, while generating a shorthand for reality which sees each side as factually equal. In the event, it becomes a prelude to the absorption or collapse of what was intended to be the deeper side, now reduced to 'values' (Voegelin, 1952: 13-23; Weber, 1949: 10-12; Wilson, 1976b) .
This apparent factual equality takes the form of an equation that contrasts the perceptibly real, on the one hand, with the normatively real, on the other. The former is assumed to be synonymous with what is 'really' the case, factually speaking, while the latter now understands by the normatively real either the isolated actor's subjectivity as a fact or those values actually held by or available to members (Weber, 1949: 1-10, 22-5, 55-60) . 1 Before giving Marx too much credit for his refusal to engage in these kinds of reductive strategies, we should note that neither economics nor sociology was sufficiently 'refined' as a discipline at the time he wrote. Having said this, it is still correct to note that Marx almost always resisted practising the fact-value distinction in his own work because it was obvious to him that the political economists almost always failed to practise it in theirs. Nevertheless, both Marx and Weber were cursed by Engels and Mannheim, respectively, interpreters whose effect was to empiricize the idea of the deeply real given in use value and substantive rationality by reducing it to subjective ends or values in their respective governing dichotomies. 2
Momentous Dichotomies and Conflicting Levels of Reality
The fact that some first-order constructs are not really constructs generated in what phenomenologists call the 'natural attitude', but are formal derivations from second-order constructs, including second-order constructs of first-order constructs, is highly significant (Voegelin, 1952) . Their purpose is to achieve a more formalized type of description, prescription and/or prediction than normally can be achieved at the first-order level whenever we employ them. Dichotomies (along with their component parts) take the form of permitted, sanctioned, even expected and required, ways of conducting conceptual and theoretical activities in our culture in order to achieve these objectives. When one side of a dichotomy is contrasted to its conceptual other by being constituted as a first-order deeper reality relative to the more superficial, available or distorted reality of this other, we have a uniquely powerful way of employing this culturally sanctioned disciplinary and professional activity.
Dichotomies, as noted, have their roots in daily life, and may have been a feature of such life and living for a very long time, if not from an early point in the human habitation of the earth. Like all forms of complex reasoning, however, their sustained strategic deployment depends not only on writing, and later the printing press, but also on the gradual ascendancy of the written tradition over the oral tradition that the latter technology has made possible (Innis, 1950 (Innis, , 1951 McLuhan, 1951 McLuhan, , 1962 McLuhan, , 1964 ). Yet what is significant here is the present theoretical utilization of second-order constructs intended to depict constructs of reality at different levels of first-order reality, in contrast to the perennial human practice of constructing first-order constructs in and through the commonsense mode of everyday life. Conspicuously absent in the first-order constructs of everyday life, in contrast to those derived from second-order constructs produced in an intellectual or scholarly mode, is the conscious reference to levels of reality and their apprehension (Edel, 1959) .
First-order constructs generated in daily life may encounter, produce and address preferences or values through what is observed in the commonsense mode. But only through second-order constructs that seek to reproduce this reality (or others) in a disciplined or theoretical mode is it possible to lay claim to the presence of a deeper reality relative to that available in and through first-order depictions. This is why the reduction of more 'momentous' and topical dichotom-ies to a mere reproduction (or implication) of the described and prescribed, of facts and values, constitutes a lower and less distinctive form of theoretical reflection and reasoning than their originals. For in this state, such a reduction is much closer to a first-order construct produced in the natural attitude of everyday life, something made possible, even necessary, by its empiricization into the taken for granted reality that is, after all, a characteristic of everyday life itself (Schutz 1962-4: Part I; Wilson, 1984: Ch. 3; 1991: Chs 3-5) .
This suggests that dichotomies may be best understood as devices which help us overcome the limitations given in second-order formalizations by employing contrasting 'sides' that are more, indeed much more, than mere descriptions and prescriptions, facts and values. Because these latter have been flattened out and effectively 'one-dimensionalized', as in the case of the reduction to values and facts, for instance, the constructive tension, the dialectical interplay, has been lost between each side. In the event, the resulting dichotomy is little more than an available shorthand for thought in the form of a second-order construct first reduced, then empiricized, into a first-order construct that is itself little more than a proxy for a description of mutually exclusive alternatives. In the case of the factvalue dichotomy, it has become an exemplar of our general culture in its very worst sense. No distinction in the modern sociological arsenal illustrates better the consequences for thought of this cultural practice of empiricization through reduction than this dichotomy. It underscores just how efficiently dichotomies addressing significant contradictions in our culture are being converted into available and sanctioned second-order versions of first-order constructs as a purposeful outcome of the process of socialization itself. This point had already been made most pointedly by Marx in his comments on the public/private dichotomy in Hegel (see Avineri, 1968) .
Our need for, as well as the culturally available practice of, dichotomization is responsible for the waning attempt to capture momentous and contradictory features of collective life in and through dichotomies. Unfortunately, it is also responsible for the heightened effort to reduce dichotomies to 'manageable proportions' by simultaneously 'empiricizing' them and rendering their 'sides' mutually exclusive. That we are especially in need of the former activity must perforce be evident in the all-encompassing power of the latter pursuit in our present culture, alongside the continuing neo-liberal political, societal and economic agenda that supports it. Momentous dichotomies like the distinctions between use value and exchange value and substantive rationality and formal rationality are simply less likely to be generated in the face of the truncated notions of the practical and commonsensical that increasingly dominate our intellectual landscape as well as our everyday life. Under the joint pressure of neoliberal practicality and postmodern forgetfulness, even reference to the term 'capitalism' has either abated altogether, or been reduced in the contemporary one-dimensional lexicon to historical description or 'obsolete discourse' (Wilson, 1976b (Wilson, , 2002 .
Not only are universities following this trend toward jettisoning forms of reflection and critique that seriously dispute the desirability of either neoliberalism or postmodernism as dominant, required or officially approved ideologies. They, along with the granting bodies to which they are increasingly beholden, are often in the forefront of such a trend in response to their desperate need for funding, often at almost any price. Over 35 years ago Robert Hutchins and Clark Kerr defined the emerging American 'multiversity' as an organization that would do anything that anyone in society wanted done if one were willing to pay for it (Hutchins, 1967; Kerr, 1964) . Not only have things not changed; the situation has intensified as a consequence of over 20 years of a neo-liberal agenda that has continued to attract public support through the electoral process in virtually all capitalist democracies. The societies being created by this agenda now include more and more people who wish to see the university turned into a training school as the quid pro quo for public and other support, 'downsized' or displaced altogether in favour of community colleges. Frequently, it is to a combination of all three of these alternatives that neo-liberal governments turn (Wilson, 1999a; cf. Bendix and Roth, 1971; Freund, 1968: 3-35; Weber, 1946b Weber, [1919 ).
While these remarks may seem far away from, if not irrelevant to, the topic of dichotomization, and in particular the dichotomies between use value and exchange value and substantive rationality and formal rationality, this is not the case. Indeed, the relation between the need for mobilizing constructive dichotomies of the sort cited, and the presence or absence of institutions committed to supporting these practices, as the university once was, must be obvious. To put the matter in a form that comports with what has already been said, the university is increasingly committed to teaching or encouraging students to flatten out or ignore altogether momentous dichotomies rather than to generate or reflect on them. That some graduate students are still encouraged to engage in this latter practice not only begs the question; it ignores the increasing pressure, even on those in fields still considered to be more esoteric, to adopt research, thesis and dissertation topics that are more 'user-friendly' to both neo-liberalism and postmodernism. It is not just that application has supplanted critical thought across a vast number of disciplines beyond professional studies; rather, the implication of such long-term research funding dependencies on the part of academic faculty and graduate students must be clear. They are being encouraged in the most direct way to acquiesce in externally defined notions of application that equate it with immediate or eventual 'commercializability', in Canada even more than in the United States, or so it would seem (Government of Canada, Advisory Council on Science and Technology, 1999, 2000 ).
Weber's Acquiescence: Treating Substantive Rationality as a 'Formal' Concept
In contrast to Weber, Marx sets the stage for his attempt to employ use value against exchange value by asserting not only its phenomenological superiority but its originary and/or future priority as well. It will be evident in what follows that Marx is far less willing to detach phenomenological from originary and future priority than Weber, and employs prediction, along with a dialectical/historical and developmental argument from both Aristotle and Hegel, as a strategy. For Marx, this is motivated by a view of the relation between concepts and reality that refuses to accept the pursuit of identity through correspondence as the sole, or even the major, justification for theoretical thought (Marx, 1973 (Marx, [1857 : 100-8; cf. Lukács, 1978; Meikle, 1985; Ollman, 1979; Sayer, 1979; Wilson, 1991: Chs 3-5) . Weber, in contrast, formalizes, and effectively de-historicizes, the activity of distinction in general and taxonomy in particular, in order to bound and define the things he is doing, as if such formal rationality were de rigueur for anyone aspiring to the mantle of 'responsible sociologist'. The irony of this is that by formalizing and de-historicizing distinctions and taxonomies in the interests of neutrality, thereby freeing both from critical reflection, he is required to acknowledge the authority of the protocol distinction between method and theory (Weber, 1978 (Weber, [1918 : 3-307). Even though this allows him to do his scientific work, as he understands it, such an acknowledgement only functions 'positively' by demonstrating his own ambivalence as a scholar who is simultaneously part of and (allegedly) at a distance from the so-called 'rationalization process' (Freund, 1968) .
At the same time, however, and as a result of this commitment to 'gatekeeping' as a central arbiter of the Methodenstreit, he underscores the difference between an observer-based scholarly orientation to reality and the critical mode of theorizing which abjures such activity on its own as anything but 'responsible'. To this end, he is forced to acquiesce to a far greater extent than Marx ever did in the distinction between description and prescription, a functional version of the fact-value dichotomy. In the event, the predictive element is smuggled in as a combination of extrapolated and inevitable (not determined) description and an implicit or explicit reference to the values of the speaker or writer. The irony of Weber's position is most readily in evidence when he provides a justification for the very reduction to facts and values that he is determined to eschew in other parts of his work. In these latter instances, he shows that he knows the difference between being a formally correct traditional scholar and a critically reflexive intellectual practitioner. This contrast is particularly evident in the mode of exposition of his early methodological essays and the combination of assertion and reflection that characterizes Economy and Society, written later. Nevertheless, the distinction between formal and substantive rationality in Weber's work does not resolve itself into a defence of the importance of critique.
Rather, it justifies the very reduction to description and prescription, facts and values, method and theory that gives the stamp of authenticity to the completion of reality because of the apparent hopelessness and futility of any 'subjective' opposition to it. This renders Weber's observations regarding the alleged pluralism and antagonism of values in human life little more than a forlorn hope (Bendix and Roth, 1971; Freund, 1968) .
To argue that conventional accounts of the tension in Weber between being an actor and a scholar thoroughly miss the mark is not to claim that they are untrue. I rather wish to make the point that they arise out of a superficial reading of him. This reading misses a deeper tension between critical thought and disciplined, scientific observation as zero-sum options in Weber, options he never fully resolved, even with Verstehen and the individualizing method. It is even tempting to argue that his alleged hostility to Marx was less a result of their different take on the facts and how to understand them than it was envy on Weber's part. After all, this form of thought and thinking had been invented by a prominent predecessor, but was no longer considered 'respectable' or 'responsible', even by Weber himself. The deeply real priority of substantive rationality becomes intolerable for Weber once reality itself has been formulated in a way that equates it solely with the facts available to a disciplined observer. That these facts are sufficient rather than only necessary to a proper description of this very reality for him leaves substantive rationality no option but to acquiesce in the values of the forlorn subject who is barely his own end, let alone that of anyone else (Wilson, 1976b) .
The idea that both sides of a dichotomy have an equal claim to the accolade of being real, or more real, is no longer sustainable in the face of a protocol which even yields pride of place to formal over substantive rationality in the way we state the dichotomy. This is in contrast to the way that we always 'know' that use value is prior in every sense to exchange value for Marx, but not as a way of falsely prioritizing prescription over description, values over facts. It is rather because the relation between them is always dynamic and dialectical, thus 'substantive' and material in the Aristotelian understanding, and never merely 'formal' like the dichotomy between 'formal' and 'substantive' (materiale) rationality in Weber (Meikle, 1985) . Weber makes this all too clear in his concluding sentence to the section of Economy and Society titled 'Formal and Substantive Rationality of Economic Action', where he makes the following observation:
Quite apart from and in addition to a substantive critique of the results of economic activity [Wirtschaftsergebnisse] , it is possible to take an ethical, ascetic, or esthetic critique of the ethos of economic activity [Wirtschaftsgesinnung] into consideration as well as the instruments of economic activity [Wirtschaftsmittel] . The 'merely formal' performance of money calculation may appear to all of these approaches as quite secondary or even as fundamentially inimical to their respective postulates (even apart from the consequences of the specifically modern calculating attitude). There is no possibility here of deciding upon but only of determining and delimiting [Festellung und Begrenzung] what is to be called 'formal'. In this context the concept 'substantive [materiale]' is itself in a certain sense 'formal'; that is, it is an abstract, generic concept. (Weber, 1978 (Weber, [1918 : 86, translation modified)
When we look at the relation of the concrete to the abstract and the whole to its parts in the thought of Marx and Weber we can see how and why formalization was much more central to Weber than to Marx. In this case, as in others, inverting two momentous distinctions like the abstract and concrete and the whole and its parts has significant implications for the epistemological assumptions of both thinkers, particularly since these distinctions constitute the most basic way we typically contrast critical and traditional theory. The result only underscores the serious differences between them, differences that are more a function of the relative roles of theory, practice and disciplined observation in the postulation of knowledge claims in each person's work than they are evidence of any absence of methodological (or procedural) self-consciousness on Marx's part. In addition, by the beginning of the 20th century there was a far more formalized and discipline-based division of labour among increasingly professionalized academics, manifested in the emergence of economics and the more 'social' sciences, than had existed in Marx's time (see Wiles, 1972: 3-14; Wilson, 1991: 180-200) .
The emergence of this more formalized academic division of labour was a subject of great concern throughout Western Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, but nowhere more so than in Germany. Throughout this period, Weber was nothing less than a 'gatekeeper' who played a central role in deciding what was and what was not theoretically and methodologically 'legitimate' in the social sciences and social theory. This is only underscored by the crucial 'brokering' function he performed, particularly at the German Sociological Society meetings in 1910 (Bendix and Roth, 1971; Cahnman, 1964) . This role made it not only possible but also necessary for him to encourage a detached and neutral posture in one role that he was more than willing to forgo in others. Indeed, importation of the concept of 'role' from its original home in the theatre into social theory and the social sciences, anticipated by Smith over a century before, provided both evidence of this division of labour and a conceptual defence of its legitimacy (Mead, 1962; Smith, 1966 Smith, [1769 ). This suggests that we recast Weber's formal distinctions so that they now function less as an indication of how 'responsible' he was and more as a device which allows him to engage in activities that are at the very least in fundamental conflict with one another.
One could even argue that in Weber we see an individual whose welldocumented torture at the hands of a civilization he despised yet could not repudiate constitutes an early extreme instance of what Merton and others would later call role strain (Merton, 1957; Marianne Weber, 1975 [1926 ) -only here the strain that arises is mainly intellectual in nature, thus between the desire to engage in an active form of reflection given its highest modern expression by Marx and the professionally respectable, but intellectually unsatisfying, activities of disciplined observation, formal gatekeeping, and 'boundary maintenance'. These latter activities, in clear contrast to the former, make their fortune out of the very societal complexity, with its apparently unavoidable 'situational ethics', that must have been a major source of pessimism for Weber. This deep conflict in Weber, reflected in the tension between intellectual and professional roles, contrasts strikingly with the far less significant conflict between thinking and acting. Seen in this light, being a hospital administrator during the Great War is far more a conscious effort by Weber to forget this deeper intellectual conflict than it is a justification for raw, unreflective, practical action.
Putting a spin like this on Weber's careful formal distinctions within sociological theory underscores the significantly altered status of both theoretical reflection and everyday life practice relative to disciplined observation in his thought. If the first must now be either reduced to testable, verifiable/falsifiable hypotheses or factually jettisoned as 'values', the second must be made responsible increasingly to the formal requirements of detachment, objectivity and neutrality (Wilson, 1976a (Wilson, , 1986 . This redefinition of practice based on a new, specifically 'societal' rationality constituted a necessary complement to the flattening out of political economy and its (Marxian) critique that was simultaneously being realized by the emergence of economics as a formal discipline (Wilson, 1991: 147-200) . The result of this new, vastly different understanding of the diminished functions of both theory and practice relative to detached and neutral disciplined observation led Weber to equate formal rationality with the concrete, and the concrete in turn with the factual. Substantive rationality, now consigned to the status of an abstraction concerned with value(s), in particular the valuing individual subject, becomes little more than a residual element of reality, seen from the standpoint of the increasingly pre-eminent, formally rational, sociological observer.
Marx's Resilience: Observing Use Value through Exchange Value
This contrasts strikingly with the relation between use values and exchange values in Marx, for in this case we are not dealing with a distinction that is mainly formal at all, but rather with one that is both historical and broadly empirical (rather than narrowly 'empiricized') in nature. This is perhaps most evident in the very different role assigned to theoretical reflection vis-à-vis detached and neutral disciplined observation in mobilizing and explicating the dialectically interpenetrating reality of contradiction that deployment of this dichotomy intends. Although Marx acknowledges that we only know use values through exchange values because only the latter are really observable as such, it is use values that nonetheless ground and make possible exchange values, both spatially and temporally and in a phenomenological sense. Such an assertion underscores the deep function of both theoretical reflection and practice vis-à-vis disciplined observation, since exchange values are only thought to be pre-eminent because they are knowable in and through everyday life and its disciplined observation. The following passage from the classic analysis of the commodity in Chapter 1 of Capital, Volume 1, makes this clear:
When commodities are in the relation of exchange, their exchange value appeared to us as something totally independent of their use value. But if one now abstracts from the use value of the products of labour, so one obtains its value, as it was just now defined. The common factor [Gemeinsame] that is represented [sich darstellt] in the exchange relation, or in the exchange value of the commodity, is therefore its value. The course of the investigation will lead us back to exchange value as the necessary mode of expression, or form of appearance [Erscheinungsform] of value, which for the present, however, is to be observed independently of this form. (Marx, 1976 (Marx, [1864 : 128, translation modified)
Yet this understanding can easily be misunderstood, particularly given our continuing preoccupation with the apparent powers and capabilities, if not selfsufficiency, of disciplined observation. When Marx addresses the limits of this activity, he really means to say that, on its own, disciplined observation is incapable of anything more than perceiving exchange value because this is the essence of both as respectively the subject and the object of the commodity (Wilson, 1977b: 236-48; 1991) . That Marx equates all forms of disciplined observation on their own with limit rather than with a self-sufficient pre-eminence is no minor matter in the present discussion. It serves to underscore the contrast between truly reflective practice and a peculiarly modern usurper that claims to have overcome both theory and practice by falsely unifying them in and through disciplined observation. The idea that such disciplined observation could dare claim the mantle of theoretical and practical self-sufficiency because it had reduced thought to testable, verifiable/falsifiable hypotheses en route to reconstituting practice in its own image struck Marx as an absurdity or as madness (Verrhcktheit; see Marx, 1976 Marx, [1864 Wolff, 1988: 61-82) . It is all too easy to forget that Marx, virtually alone among post-Hegelian thinkers of his day, sought to steer a careful course between two extreme positions on the matter of how best to seek human improvement. He accepted neither Comte's view that the social sciences should displace philosophy in this quest nor Hegel's view that a philosophically inspired practice was what was mainly required. For Marx, observation, no matter how necessary, always functions as a limit to understanding whenever it is alleged to constitute a mode of knowing, however disciplined, which claims to be both autonomous from and superior to either reflection or practice, but especially to both taken together.
This phenomenological priority of use values is complemented by Marx's historical observation that exchange values only take hold and proliferate at the boundaries of communities, where relations between strangers are the norm (Marx, 1973 (Marx, [1857 ). There is in this claim an observation about the impact of economic growth, expansion and development over time, space and circumstance on traditional networks of extended family, kin and groups of families in common locales. At the same time, this observation simply builds upon and extends his phenomenological claim, inasmuch as there is a clear and unmistakable sense that for Marx relations between strangers, however inevitable and however necessary, still constitute an interruption in normal, daily life that will eventually be overcome. Only now we must turn to the interplay of human sense-making processes observed, then reflected upon, in historical time and space through the labour process in order to understand the limits of disciplined observation vis-à-vis both theory and practice. In the Marxian eschatology, history means the production of humanity as a species being that reclaims its collective origins in the whole by overcoming the contradiction between use value and exchange value, thereby confirming labour as the source of all value (Marx, 1973 (Marx, [1857 : 83-11; Wilson, 1999b) .
For Marx, then, use value is equated with the whole, which is understood to be concrete, in contrast to exchange value, which is equated with some to many of its parts and is understood to be abstract. Use values are not temporally and historically bound in the way that exchange values would seem to be because they are not derived, but are primarily the objects of everyday life rather than of disciplined observation. What thus may appear from our vantage point to be a theoretical reversal of conceptual etiquette on Marx's part expresses not only an innovative adaptation of a strong tradition of thinking that reached its apogee with Hegel; it also constitutes a strategic reconsideration of the categories of political economy themselves. The supplanting of both reflection and practice by disciplined observation makes it more and more likely that we shall rest satisfied with the epithet of the irrational or the pre-modern as a description of essentialist, holistic and historicist modes of thinking and theorizing. As it turns out, this mode of reflection has been a central element in human thought from the very beginning. It provides us with many impressive modern formulations, and increasingly constitutes the vanguard of a 'post-postmodern' response to postmodern thinking itself (compare Hayek, 1955; Popper, 1945 , with Adorno et al., 1976 Marcuse and Popper, 1976; and Wilson, 1977b) .
This becomes clear when we turn our attention to Baudrillard's two studies that address the distinction between use values and exchange values most directly. Baudrillard insists on treating use values as nonexistent because Marx admits that they can only be known through exchange values. He thereby falls into the trap of equating the real with that which can be perceived by and through one or another form of observation. This leads him to accept literally Marx's employment of the term 'value' as something which belongs with use as well as exchange activities, even though Marx frequently employs exchange value and value per se interchangeably, as already noted. A closer inspection reveals that Marx reconstructs 'use values' as activities having a value in order to provide a form of equivalence that will allow him to compare them for his readers and listeners, and for no other reason. This means that Baudrillard's discussion of the use value of a commodity and of the labour power required to produce it, though it faithfully reproduces Marx's exposition to his readers and listeners, misses the deeper intention of this surface formalization and reconstruction. Marx was simply required by the circumstances of the debate with political economy to employ a convention that we all have to engage in from time to time, namely recasting in our opponent's language our own differences with him or her in order to begin or continue the conversation.
This becomes apparent once we remember that Marx continued to harbor the hope that his own critique of Ricardian political economy would eventually come to constitute the new mainstream in the developing discipline of economics until well into his work on Capital, Volume I. Marx had the choice of either staying true to the labour theory of value that the political economists themselves had turned away from in their haste to embrace and become apologists for capital, or of following them into their hypocrisies of self-justification, including their reinterpretations of Locke and Smith in particular. His choice of the first alternative required not only a strategy of disputation and persuasion that included redefining use as a form of value (Wolff, 1988) ; as noted, it also required him to mediate between an Hegelian and a Comtian approach to knowledge and knowing by acknowledging a limited, but nevertheless important, role for disciplined observation and its more specific understanding of the 'empirical' (Wilson, 1991 : Chs 3 and 6). Baudrillard's apparent confusion on this score is highly suspect, not only because of his obvious intellectual acumen, revealed in his sensitivity to and experience with these concepts; it is also clear that his confusion arises out of what can only be a purposeful (or simply strategic) misunderstanding of the project that Marx was engaged in. In order to make a monkey out of Marx, he has to endorse, or at least provide implicit support for, the very self-sufficiency of disciplined observation that Marx was at such pains to dispute in his critique of the method of political economy (Marx, 1973 (Marx, [1857 : 108-11).
To be sure, such a posture is certainly compatible with the contempt for critical reflection that is so central to both formal rationality and neo-liberalism. This is because it either asserts or implies the futility or danger inherent in all arguments that do not reduce thought and thinking to less momentous distinctions and a more hypothetical role for theory relative to both disciplined observation and 'piecemeal' outcomes. The commitment to holding the tension between each side of a distinction, where the empirical is only one among many components in determining reality and the real, is abjured in favor of an immediate resolution -efficient causality over all other contenders (Wilson, 1976a (Wilson, , 1986 (Wilson, , 1999b . It is obvious that Baudrillard does not do this in order to defend positivistic notions of reality premised on identity and correspondence; on the contrary. It is rather that postmodern deconstruction will use any intellectual weapon at its disposal to assert as a final negation the futility of negative dialectics' negation of the self-sufficiency of disciplined observation as a proxy for thought and practice.
Dialectical Momentousness versus OneDimensional Reduction
It was suggested earlier that dichotomies are devices which can often capture more of the complexity of first-order constructs without sacrificing the greater conceptual precision of second-order constructs. Weber, after all, was the first to admit that the price one paid for the conceptual precision of 'ideal types', what Schütz and others would later call second-order constructs, was the complexity of empirical reality itself (Schütz, 1962-4; Weber, 1949: 43) . Once we acknowledge that this reality usually begins or ends by being coincident with what Schütz called first-order constructs, we can understand better Marx's refusal to allow the limits of identitarian and correspondential thinking to engender a sense of futility. This helps us realize why distinctions are devices for coping with the fact that the world and its understanding require the play of concepts in the form of momentous dichotomies that present us with alternatives, possibilities and choices within and between, whether on a continuum or otherwise. Dichotomies allow us to turn a sow's ear into a silk purse by making what formally might constitute a clear limit into an opportunity for reflection on what could be, should be and/or really is the case. The concept, in its relation to observation, perception and thought, either directly derived from or relatively independent of it, thus provides us with a singular opportunity. It can now configure the whole we really want to talk about in ways that we really need to talk about it precisely because dichotomization has been given the widest and deepest possible ambit (Wilson, 1984: 88-97) . This is in no way intended to ignore or play down the point that dichotomies are not only different because perspectives and cognitive interests are different, but also that they acquire a different status based on the way they are valued by others depending on the latter's purposes. I have tried to address this topic by comparing and contrasting the ways that Marx and Weber develop, extend and employ what I believe to be two of their most seminal dichotomies. For my purposes here, there should be little doubt as to which dichotomy I believe to be the more capacious, momentous and seminal. My interest has been to try to make sense of contemporary events and developments from the sort of critical perspective that I think is better mobilized by Marx than Weber. Having said this, I cannot deny that this result is in large part explained by the fact that it was Marx's implicit, and often explicit, intention, certainly after Capital, Volume I if not before, to provide this very perspective, in clear contrast to Weber. While Marx only became a gatekeeper by turning on many of his activist supporters, declaring that he was not, after all, a Marxist, Weber became one following recovery from a near-total nervous collapse through academic recognition of his knowledge and erudition (Marianne Weber, 1975 [1926 ).
This contrast should be enough to underscore the importance of circumstances alongside heredity and more general socialization in influencing not only the dichotomies that will be chosen but also the ways they will be employed to achieve particular political, social and cultural, as well as intellectual, purposes. By Marx's own rules of engagement, to which I have clearly given priority here, dichotomies are the more effective and successful in their purposes the more momentous, even dialectically momentous, they are. For Weber, however, the function of this very basic human tendency was quite different, mainly because of methodological concerns and preferences not unrelated to his background, circumstances and resulting values. Save for the central instance I have recounted, Weber did not address dichotomies as a methodological subject of study to anywhere near the same extent as Marx, probably because he tended to view them as the product of formally rational, abstract processes. Weber's approach to both concept formation and dichotomies indicates the increasingly important function of formal rationality and formal discipline in the emergence and development of what were already recognized, or soon to be known, as 'disciplines' during his adult life. He effectively purges dialectics from the process of conceiving, formulating and applying dichotomies in favour of a conception of 'sides' that views them as formally exclusive (or 'vanishing') rather than empirically interpenetrating and interdependent (Jameson, 1973; Meikle, 1985; Zeleny, 1980) .
Further to this point, perhaps it was Weber's desire, no less than Durkheim's from his own quite different perspective and concerns, to support and encourage the formal recognition of sociology as a professional, as well as an intellectual, discipline (compare Weber, 1949: 72-8, 89-94; [1918 : 1-4, 11; with Durkheim, 1952 Durkheim, [1893 : Introduction, Conclusion). This in contrast to Marx, whose interest in such recognition for economics first led him to try to realize the true aims of a theoretical practice led astray by Ricardo and his supporters, and then, when it failed, forced him to develop a critically reflexive counter-structure faithful to the original goals of political economy. In this sense, and ironically, the present-day discipline of economics constitutes the defeat of Marx's initial efforts as the price he had to pay for the confirmation of his theory of development. This defeat took the form of the repudiation of his true political economy, one based on the priority of labour to capital rather than the reverse, and one necessarily addressed to the future as well as the present (Wilson, 1991: Chs 1, 4, 7, Appendix) . Instead of acquiescing in traditional theory, with its conceptual nominalism, concrete particulars and abstract wholes, and in the reduction of thought to testable, verifiable/falsifiable hypotheses, Marx resisted this denaturing of theory, which only purged it of dialectics so it could appropriate a flattened-out proxy for reality through method. Marx clearly realized that this also constituted a political/economic agenda, whether understood by its practitioners or not, in contrast to Weber, who tried, often successfully, to repress what he clearly knew to be the case (Wilson, 1976b) .
As Wittgenstein argued, our tendency to dichotomize reflects a deep need to accomplish through conceptualization a theoretical proxy for certain knowledge, where it is implicitly or explicitly understood that such knowledge is not possible, and may even be undesirable (Wittgenstein, 1977 (Wittgenstein, [1969 ; see also Manser, 1973; Rubenstein, 1981; Wilson, 1984 Wilson, , 1991 . In this effort, the categories we formulate and prosecute relative to the respective roles and priorities of thought, observation and perception, logic, generalization and value, among other things, must be judged by reference to our own needs, values and circumstances. But this is not to say that we either can or should allow the circumstances and biography of others to override our own needs as intellectuals, no matter how much 'respect' we hold them in. This point is somewhat ironic given my own purposes here, because it is Weber himself who never tired of telling us how important it is that we understand our own values to the best of our ability (Weber, 1949: 21-3) . 3 Weber's very ambivalence toward, and one-sided endorsement of, the requirements of discipline and formality in all sociological practices, however understandable in the circumstances, makes his seminal dichotomy between substantive and formal rationality less useful for me. The very fact that he gave priority and precedence to formal over substantive rationality in the way that he stated the dichotomy is at the very least telling, if not conclusive, on this score.
Weber's dichotomy provides me with less theoretical space for critique and the construction of more human collective forms than Marx's distinction between use and exchange values because the dialectical tension implicit in the latter has been resolved in the former by formal rationality in favour of formal rationality. Sociology is thus happily obliged to acquiesce in this supremacy for Weber in ways that were unacceptable for Marx in his ongoing battle with political economy and its heirs at an earlier date. In his ambivalence, Weber knew that the theoretical space should be there and desperately needed to be there, but could not leave his post in good conscience and assert the social, as well as the theoretical, priority of substantive over formal rationality. Even its moral priority could only be acknowledged if this latter was equated with a formally encircled subject conceived as an object for a professionalizing sociology whose progress demanded that it sacrifice what Durkheim called 'the silence of the study' for specialization. Weber reposed no hope in the possibility of an alternate collective form, and grudgingly endorsed a sociology that was hostaged to formal rationality as a consequence. Durkheim, in contrast, embraced the opportunity to endorse his sociology as the science of a new solidarity, with its task of constructing a professional 'moral code' for industrial society itself (Durkheim, 1952 (Durkheim, [1893 : 406-9).
In opposition to both Weber and Durkheim, I want to argue that we can, should and must mobilize and utilize dialectically momentous dichotomies in order to turn a sow's ear into a silk purse. In doing so, we must perforce indicate to our students and to other citizens why this is a good, desirable and necessary thing to do, not only for thought but for practical reasons as well. Indeed, it is an intellectual activity that we must not allow to be sacrificed to anybody's agenda, especially given today's neo-liberal attacks on thought and reflection in all its forms, save for those endorsed as either postmodern or of 'practical' value to capital's 'bottom line'. Dialectically momentous dichotomies address limit as opportunity, which is to say that the activity of conceiving, formulating and applying them is good and desirable both for intellectuals and for society as a whole. This is because they open out the space for thought relative to discipline in all its forms, whether method, organization, legality or in subjects and 'disciplines' that are guided by these values (Wilson, 1973 (Wilson, , 1977a . They implicitly oppose the present supremacy, tending toward hegemony, of temporal over spatial values, by helping us locate, ground and sediment the real nature of these temporal values as ones thoroughly hostaged to an exchange process led by a globalizing capitalism (Wilson, 2002) . In clear contrast, capital asserts and defends not only its need, but its right, to be in a zero-sum relation to use values because use values prioritize space over time and support a redefinition of time relative to space that can only compromise exchange values (Wilson, 1999b) .
Facts, Values and the Reality of Possibility
The construction and prosecution of momentous dichotomies is consequential for the relationship between theory and practice for reasons that are independent of the need for critical intellectualism and reflexivity for their own sake, however much these practices benefit from dichotomization. At some point a crucial inversion occurred, one that is captured in the difference between the dichotomization practices of Marx and Weber. From life being the norm against which exchange value was addressed critically because of how far short it fell for Marx, life as substantive rationality became the residue that was assumed to reside within the emerging totality of formal rationality as the norm for Weber. To the extent that we can find a single excerpt that captures this recognition in Weber, it is the one already cited from Economy and Society that reduces substantive rationality to an abstract, formal concept in sociology. This is in clear contrast to Marx's insistence in Chapter 1 of Capital, Volume 1, on attaching a value to use only in order to criticize capitalism and its worship of exchange value in the conceptual and terminological language of his opponents. 'Value' in Marx is always implicated in the fact that exchange only occurs at the boundary rather than at the core of collective life, whether we understand by 'boundary' a spatial/territorial or a normative concept. The implications of this reality for a globalizing capitalism are purposefully avoided rather than confronted head-on in Weber's reformulation of this process as one characterized by faceless rationalization (Freund, 1968; Loewith, 1970 Loewith, [1932 ; Marcuse, 1968 Marcuse, [1964 .
The implications of this consequential inversion, well captured in the very different understandings of concept formation, theorizing and the construction of momentous rather than 'formal' dichotomies in Marx and Weber, respectively, returns me to the topic of the 'significant other' and its central role in dichotomization practices. For it is only by confronting what has happened to thought and thinking as a consequence of the requirement that dichotomies be reduced to mutually exclusive, formally empiricized alternatives that we can appreciate this inversion for what it really signifies. Instead of life in the guise of use and function constituting the one side and capital and exchange value the increasingly significant other, the central reality from which we take our sociological point of departure is now formal rationality and the inexorable process of rationalization. The encircled subject-as-object of substantive rationality, far from being the real one, is little more than an object of nostalgia, thus hardly a significant other at all, whether alone or in the aggregate. Meanwhile, sociology continues to pretend, albeit with a decreased sense of urgency, that this formally rational one really is the other in the person of the 'secondary group', when it is clear that in fact the socalled 'primary group' has become secondary in all but name. Sociology thus occupies the space bounded by the one and the 'significant' other in a form that is all too authentic to its real project -the triumph of disciplined observation. This makes it more and more difficult for theory to assert human possibilities that now always seem utopian because of what the theory-practice relationship has become under the joint hegemony of formal rationality and value on exchange (Wilson, 1977b: 231-3; 1999a) .
In the light of this project of denaturing thought and theory by reducing dichotomies to one-dimensional and mutually exclusive either/ors, we must ask the following question: Is it possible any longer for either side of a dichotomy to be significant as a one or an other in such a parody of both reality and possibility? That such a question may seem silly or inconsequential only underscores the extent to which we no longer expect dichotomization to perform the functions that it originally was, and still is, made for. The journey from the one extreme of dialectical momentousness toward its opposite extreme of one-dimensional, either/or, mutual exclusivity was already well underway when Marx attempted to challenge it first within, then against, political economy. One could even argue that Marx's critique of the method of political economy, in the Grundrisse and elsewhere, provides indirect evidence of just this kind of concern about the diminished role of dichotomization once Ricardo and his successors had begun to convert political economy into economics. 4 For Weber, in contrast, dichotomies must simultaneously be heuristically respectable as 'ideal typical' tools for analysis rather than an analytical centre in their own right, while also constituting an occasional basis for conducting guerilla warfare against that which must sociologically, historically and descriptively/realistically 'be'.
The fact that one still thinks of dichotomization as a process of potentially momentous thinking in Marx, while being more prone to consider dichotomies as relatively formal vehicles for an analysis that lies outside them in Weber, is enough to make the point. It suggests that the combination of positivism and idealism is probably more lethal to critical thought and deep counter-structural analysis than either one on its own (Wilson, 1991: Ch. 5, 127-8, 108 ). Dichotomies as formal devices become a central part of the conceptual territory possessed by a given discipline, instruments whose unmediated descriptive potential makes them vehicles in the appropriation of a reality for which there is 'really' no alternative. Literalism becomes ever more the order of the day, as, for example, when Marx is 'tripped up' by Baudrillard for not realizing that, after all is said and done, use value really cannot exist. To be sure, dichotomization, as evidenced by this and other renderings, has since fallen on even harder times than is evident in Weber's work. This was, if not prefigured, then certainly intimated in Weber's anticipation that once dichotomies rather than dichotomization became the focus, they would be judged as valuable precisely to the extent that they achieved the very false concreteness that they were intended to escape (Andreski, 1964: 1-18; Brown, 1969; Jameson, 1973) .
In the event, the model of utility and function is today as far from Marx as one might imagine in the circumstances; that is to say, it is defined by reference to those dichotomies whose earlier versions had been most emptied and flattened out. Such unreflective -thus practically as well as intellectually unchallengingdistinctions were, after all, best capable of functioning as proxies for the very foreordained descriptions to which they were now to be limited 'with the certainty of a fate'. No dichotomy better realizes this status as the centrepiece of our indefinitely unfolding, globalizing, one-dimensional present without end than the distinction between facts and values. Once values have been reduced to actor subjectivity and irrationality and brought into the world in ways that make it impossible for their use to really be of value in the face of their exchange potential, even the apparent equality of facts and values becomes both fictive and utopian. In its place we have a world increasingly denuded not only of possibility in reality but of reality in possibility, a world full of facts that amount, whenever required by the 'objectively correct' rendering, to little more than actors' descriptions, reduced to subjective values. 5 This rendering, not surprisingly, is increasingly synonymous with what I have elsewhere called, in deference to (incorrect) American rather than (correct) European practice, neo-conservatism.
Not wishing to end on a pessimistic refrain, however, I suggest that, as aggregated yet solitary individuals, we begin to reverse this false impression by reconceiving, then acting on the basis of, the university and higher education generally as an opportunity rather than a limit. Central to this endeavour will be our commitment to reviving momentousness and true topicality in and through dichotomization as a dynamic practice whose prosecution prioritizes space over time in an effort to assert the importance of use value as sense of function (Adorno, 1969: 105; Wilson, 1999a Wilson, , 1999b Wilson, , 1980 . Subverting the aims of those who govern our universities by proclaiming that the true community is comprised of faculty and undergraduate and graduate students rather than administrators and private benefactors, with the state as grant-giver and legitimator of the dominant ideology, seems to me an excellent place to begin.
Notes

1.
In Methodology of the Social Sciences (Weber, 1949: 53-4) , and elsewhere in this text, Weber alludes to the possibility that scientifically valid social science analysis can, indeed must, strive for supra-cultural validity, however impossible the achievement of this goal may be. This is the real, strategic reason why Weber, as editor of the Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, needed to defend both value-freedom (Wertfreiheit) given value relevance or relatedness (Wertbeziehung) and the corollary protocol reduction to facts and values as an operational requirement in social science research and presentation.
2.
I discuss 'empiricization' in several places throughout Tradition and Innovation (1984) as an intellectual and cultural activity and process necessary for generating the commitment to independent and autonomous 'facts of life'. As a moment of practice, this commitment is necessary if we are to engage in abstraction, but must never be considered sufficient in the absence of reflexivity. Failure to complete the full circuit of thought, and the resulting empiricization on its own, always favours a false, technicized practice and a preference for flattened-out, unmomentous, one-dimensional distinctions. Such distinctions, alongside an unwavering commitment to 'facts of life', are all too often the essence of our 'form of life' in advanced industrial societies.
3.
Weber's insistence on knowing one's own values can be compared to Jacques Monod in Chance and Necessity (1972 [1970] ). Monod argues that it is precisely the fact that we cannot change our most fundamental values that limits our ability to know them as an observer rather than an 'owner'.
4.
In Theories of Surplus Value, Part II, Marx (n.d.) thoroughly anticipates in his critique of Ricardo the preoccupation of the emerging discipline of economics with the premature rush to 'laws' understood (wrongly) by reference to the physical rather than the biological sciences.
5.
But see how Weber, in Methodology of the Social Sciences (1949) , tries to deny that recourse to ideal types implies a 'rationalistic bias', no matter what values they seem to be straining toward, when it is clear that sociological method is no less subordinate to formal rationality, and therefore exchange values, than substantive rationality itself. This is even more obvious in Economy and Society (1978 [1918-20] : 26-8).
